

Functional Safety Applied to Cooperative Automotive Architecture

Motivations

Problem:

- Cooperative driving not well addressed in ISO 26262
- High rate of communication failures; fault or operational condition?

Target:

- Justify Safety Kernel (SK) according to ISO 26262
- Identify ISO 26262 improvement lines



Approach

Challenges:


- Communication failures be taken into account
- The solution be reasonable versus market constraints
- Keep adherence to ISO 26262

Key Idea:

- Communication classified as QM

Steps:

- Introduce remote sensors
- Start from primitive architecture
- Perform HARA taking into account communication and sensor failures
- Define Safety Kernel as Safety Mechanism
- Prove correctness and effectiveness



Results

Proof Method:

- Fault Tree and Error Propagation analysis
- ASIL Decomposition

Results:

- Safety Kernel Elements (ASIL D): Such safety critical systems needs a high level of integrity.
- Data Fusion (ASIL C): Having innate redundancy concept, the level of integrity is reduced whilst the element is still critical.
- Onboard Sensing (ASIL C): The presence of onboard diagnostics and data fusion lets failure mitigation.
- Remote Sensing (QM): The vehicle can still work safely in the absence of communication.
- Safe states: Correspond to automation levels.
- Recommendations to improve ISO 26262: Shared SM, ASIL E, Comm. faults.

FTA Notations

